This paper hypothesizes that the paradox Hart confesses to in Ch.X of Essays on Bentham was the result of metaethical ambivalence.All forms of voluntarism face this challenge, called Euthyphro's dilemma.
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But whether or not Kelsen can exegetically be read along impinging lines need not worry us, for the only reason it interests us here is its potential to illustrate the working of the impinging model of normativity.
Throughout this article, therefore, when we refer to Kelsen's model of normativity it is this note 28, at 23.
Euginio Bulygin identifies an antinomy in Kelsen's model.
Kelsen's model of normativity, Bulygin assumes, operates along the lines of the natural lawyers’ model.However, the “source” of normativity Hart seemed keen to advance—he makes an “attitude” the source of normativity—was only congruous with the projectivist model.If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Does this mean that the version of the rule of recognition that was not congruous with the impinging model was congruous with the projectivist model?‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.As such, Bulygin's reading of Kelsen is of a piece with those of Olivecrona, Ross, and Raz.Bulygin then points out how this conception of normativity sat oddly with Kelsen's semantics of statements of legal obligation.Perhaps a little more needs to be said in defense of Kelsen's invocation as an exemplar of the impinging model before we proceed any further.Roughly, Kelsen's Section II for discussion) as taking the place of the objective moral requirement in the standard impinging model and acting as the fount of normativity and moral bindingness. Norm-relativist statements are “normative” in the wide sense of “normative” but are distinct from moral statements.The statement of legal obligations congruous with Kelsen's model of normativity was the cognitivist one, namely, that statements of legal obligation purport to state moral reasons for action.The legal statements would be truth-apt in relation to such moral reasons.